Wind energy aggregation: A coalitional game approach

E. Baeyens, E.Y. Bitar, P.P. Khargonekar, K. Poolla

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

42 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper we explore the extent to which a group of N wind power producers can exploit the statistical benefits of aggregation and quantity risk sharing by forming a willing coalition to pool their variable power to jointly offer their aggregate power output as single entity into a forward energy market. We prove that wind power generators will always improve their expected profit when they aggregate their generated power and use tools from coalitional game theory to design fair sharing mechanisms to allocate the payoff among the coalition participants. We show that the corresponding coalitional game is super-additive and has a nonempty core. Hence, there always exists a mechanism for profit-sharing that makes the coalition stable. However, the game is not convex and the celebrated Shapley value may not belong to the core of the game. An allocation mechanism that minimizes the worst-case dissatisfaction is proposed. © 2011 IEEE.
Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationIEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Pages3000-3007
Number of pages8
ISBN (Print)9781612848013
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2011
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Wind energy aggregation: A coalitional game approach'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this