TY - GEN

T1 - Smart grid data integrity attacks: characterizations and countermeasures$^{π}$

AU - Giani, Annarita

AU - Bitar, Eilyan

AU - Garcia, Manuel

AU - McQueen, Miles

AU - Khargonekar, Pramod

AU - Poolla, Kameshwar

N1 - KAUST Repository Item: Exported on 2020-10-01
Acknowledged KAUST grant number(s): 025478
Acknowledgements: Supported in part by OOF991-KAUST US LIMITED under awardnumber 025478, the UC Discovery Grant ele07-10283 under theIMPACT program, and NSF under Grant EECS-0925337, the FloridaEnergy Systems Consortium, and Idaho National Labs.
This publication acknowledges KAUST support, but has no KAUST affiliated authors.

PY - 2011/10

Y1 - 2011/10

N2 - Coordinated cyberattacks of power meter readings can be arranged to be undetectable by any bad data detection algorithm in the power system state estimation process. These unobservable attacks present a potentially serious threat to grid operations. Of particular interest are sparse attacks that involve the compromise of a modest number of meter readings. An efficient algorithm to find all unobservable attacks [under standard DC load flow approximations] involving the compromise of exactly two power injection meters and an arbitrary number of line power meters is presented. This requires O(n 2m) flops for a power system with n buses and m line meters. If all lines are metered, there exist canonical forms that characterize all 3, 4, and 5-sparse unobservable attacks. These can be quickly detected in power systems using standard graph algorithms. Known-secure phasor measurement units [PMUs] can be used as countermeasures against an arbitrary collection of cyberattacks. Finding the minimum number of necessary PMUs is NP-hard. It is shown that p + 1 PMUs at carefully chosen buses are sufficient to neutralize a collection of p cyberattacks. © 2011 IEEE.

AB - Coordinated cyberattacks of power meter readings can be arranged to be undetectable by any bad data detection algorithm in the power system state estimation process. These unobservable attacks present a potentially serious threat to grid operations. Of particular interest are sparse attacks that involve the compromise of a modest number of meter readings. An efficient algorithm to find all unobservable attacks [under standard DC load flow approximations] involving the compromise of exactly two power injection meters and an arbitrary number of line power meters is presented. This requires O(n 2m) flops for a power system with n buses and m line meters. If all lines are metered, there exist canonical forms that characterize all 3, 4, and 5-sparse unobservable attacks. These can be quickly detected in power systems using standard graph algorithms. Known-secure phasor measurement units [PMUs] can be used as countermeasures against an arbitrary collection of cyberattacks. Finding the minimum number of necessary PMUs is NP-hard. It is shown that p + 1 PMUs at carefully chosen buses are sufficient to neutralize a collection of p cyberattacks. © 2011 IEEE.

UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10754/599649

UR - http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6102324/

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84855833052&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/SmartGridComm.2011.6102324

DO - 10.1109/SmartGridComm.2011.6102324

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 9781457717024

SP - 232

EP - 237

BT - 2011 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm)

PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)

ER -