TY - JOUR

T1 - Resilience of LTE eNode B against smart jammer in infinite-horizon asymmetric repeated zero-sum game

AU - Aziz, Farhan M.

AU - Li, Lichun

AU - Shamma, Jeff S.

AU - Stüber, Gordon L.

N1 - KAUST Repository Item: Exported on 2020-10-01
Acknowledgements: The research reported in this publication was supported in part by funding from the US AFOSR/MURI project # FA9550-10-1-0573, the US ARO project # W911NF-09-1-0553, and the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST), Thuwal, Saudi Arabia.

PY - 2020/1/2

Y1 - 2020/1/2

N2 - It has been proposed to use Long Term Evolution (LTE)/LTE-Advanced (LTE-A) networks for mission critical and public safety applications. However, LTE/LTE-A networks are known to be vulnerable to denial-of-service (DOS) and loss-of-service attacks from smart jammers. This article deals with the resilience of LTE/LTE-A eNode B against smart jamming attacks in an infinite-horizon asymmetric repeated zero-sum game and introduces algorithms for constructing efficient strategies for both players (smart jammer and eNode B) in such a game. It has been shown in game-theoretic literature that security strategies provide optimal solution in zero-sum games and that both players’ security strategies in an infinite-horizon asymmetric repeated zero-sum game depend only on the history of informed player's actions. However, fixed-sized sufficient statistics are needed for both players to solve an infinite-horizon game efficiently with memory constraints. Smart jammer (informed player) uses its evolving belief state as the fixed-sized sufficient statistic for the repeated game. Whereas, LTE eNode B (uninformed player) uses worst-case regret of its security strategy and its anti-discounted update as the fixed-sized sufficient statistic. Although fixed-sized sufficient statistics are exploited by both players, optimal security strategy computation in λ-discounted asymmetric games is still hard to compute because of non-convexity. Hence, the problem is convexified by devising suboptimal security strategies with guaranteed performance for both players that are based on approximated optimal game value. However, “approximated” strategies require full monitoring. Therefore, a simplistic yet effective “expected” strategy is also constructed for LTE eNode B (uninformed player) that does not require full monitoring. The simulation results show that smart jammer maintains its dominance at a long range of prior probability values by playing non-revealing and misleading strategies against the network for its long-term advantage.

AB - It has been proposed to use Long Term Evolution (LTE)/LTE-Advanced (LTE-A) networks for mission critical and public safety applications. However, LTE/LTE-A networks are known to be vulnerable to denial-of-service (DOS) and loss-of-service attacks from smart jammers. This article deals with the resilience of LTE/LTE-A eNode B against smart jamming attacks in an infinite-horizon asymmetric repeated zero-sum game and introduces algorithms for constructing efficient strategies for both players (smart jammer and eNode B) in such a game. It has been shown in game-theoretic literature that security strategies provide optimal solution in zero-sum games and that both players’ security strategies in an infinite-horizon asymmetric repeated zero-sum game depend only on the history of informed player's actions. However, fixed-sized sufficient statistics are needed for both players to solve an infinite-horizon game efficiently with memory constraints. Smart jammer (informed player) uses its evolving belief state as the fixed-sized sufficient statistic for the repeated game. Whereas, LTE eNode B (uninformed player) uses worst-case regret of its security strategy and its anti-discounted update as the fixed-sized sufficient statistic. Although fixed-sized sufficient statistics are exploited by both players, optimal security strategy computation in λ-discounted asymmetric games is still hard to compute because of non-convexity. Hence, the problem is convexified by devising suboptimal security strategies with guaranteed performance for both players that are based on approximated optimal game value. However, “approximated” strategies require full monitoring. Therefore, a simplistic yet effective “expected” strategy is also constructed for LTE eNode B (uninformed player) that does not require full monitoring. The simulation results show that smart jammer maintains its dominance at a long range of prior probability values by playing non-revealing and misleading strategies against the network for its long-term advantage.

UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10754/661265

UR - https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1874490719304938

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85077506393&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.phycom.2019.100989

DO - 10.1016/j.phycom.2019.100989

M3 - Article

VL - 39

SP - 100989

JO - Physical Communication

JF - Physical Communication

SN - 1874-4907

ER -