Randomized agreement protocols have been around for more than two decades. Often assumed to be inef dent due to their high expected communication and time complexities, they have remained largely overlooked by the community-at-large as a valid solution for the deployment of fault-tolerant distributed systems. This paper aims to demonstrate that randomization can be a very competitive approach even in hostile environments where arbitrary faults can occur. A stack of randomized intrusion-tolerant protocols is described and its performance evaluated under different faultloads. The stack provides a set of relevant services ranging from basic communication primitives up to atomic broadcast. The experimental evaluation shows that the protocols are ef cient and no performance reduction is observed under certain Byzantine faults. © 2006 IEEE.
|Original language||English (US)|
|Title of host publication||Proceedings of the International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks|
|Number of pages||10|
|State||Published - Dec 22 2006|