Global games with noisy sharing of information

Behrouz Touri, Jeff S. Shamma

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

We provide a framework for the study of global games with noisy sharing of information. In contrast to the previous works where it is shown that an intuitive threshold policy is an equilibrium for such games, we show that noisy sharing of information leads to non-existence of such an equilibrium. We also investigate the group best-response dynamics of two groups of agents sharing the same information to threshold policies based on each group's observation and show the convergence of such dynamics.
Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication53rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Pages4473-4478
Number of pages6
ISBN (Print)9781467360906
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 17 2015
Externally publishedYes

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