Efficient Byzantine-resilient reliable multicast on a hybrid failure model

Miguel Correia, Lau Cheuk Lung, Nuno Ferreira Neves, Paulo Veríssimo

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21 Scopus citations

Abstract

The paper presents a new reliable multicast protocol that tolerates arbitrary faults, including Byzantine faults. This protocol is developed using a novel way of designing secure protocols which is based on a well-founded hybrid failure model. Despite our claim of arbitrary failure resilience, the protocol needs not necessarily incur the cost of "Byzantine agreement", in number of participants and round/message complexity. It can rely on the existence of a simple distributed security kernel-the TTCB-where the participants only execute crucial parts of the protocol operation, under the protection of a crash failure model. Otherwise, participants follow an arbitrary failure model. The TTCB provides only a few basic services, which allow our protocol to have an efficiency similar to that of accidental fault-tolerant protocols: for f faults, our protocol requires f+2 processes, instead of 3f+1 in Byzantine systems. Besides, the TTCB (which is synchronous) allows secure operation of timed protocols, despite the unpredictable time behavior of the environment (possibly due to attacks on timing assumptions).
Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)2-11
Number of pages10
JournalProceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2002
Externally publishedYes

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