Cooperative Control and Potential Games

J. R. Marden*, G. Arslan, J. S. Shamma

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

316 Scopus citations

Abstract

We present a view of cooperative control using the language of learning in games. We review the game-theoretic concepts of potential and weakly acyclic games, and demonstrate how several cooperative control problems, such as consensus and dynamic sensor coverage, can be formulated in these settings. Motivated by this connection, we build upon game-theoretic concepts to better accommodate a broader class of cooperative control problems. In particular, we extend existing learning algorithms to accommodate restricted action sets caused by the limitations of agent capabilities and group-based decision making. Furthermore, we also introduce a new class of games called sometimes weakly acyclic games for time-varying objective functions and action sets, and provide distributed algorithms for convergence to an equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1393-1407
Number of pages15
JournalIEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics
Volume39
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 16 2009

Keywords

  • Cooperative control
  • Cooperative systems
  • Game theory
  • Learning
  • Learning in games
  • Multi-agent systems
  • Multiagent systems

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Software
  • Information Systems
  • Human-Computer Interaction
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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