Connections between cooperative control and potential games illustrated on the consensus problem

Jason R. Marden, Gurdal Arslan, Jeff S. Shamma

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

42 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper presents a view of cooperative control using the language of learning in games. We review the game theoretic concepts of potential games and weakly acyclic games and demonstrate how the specific cooperative control problem of consensus can be formulated in these settings. Motivated by this connection, we build upon game theoretic concepts to better accommodate a broader class of cooperative control problems. In particular, we introduce sometimes weakly acyclic games for time-varying objective functions and action sets, and provide distributed algorithms for convergence to an equilibrium. Finally, we illustrate how to implement these algorithms for the consensus problem in a variety of settings, most notably, in an environment with non-convex obstructions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2007 European Control Conference, ECC 2007
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages4604-4611
Number of pages8
ISBN (Electronic)9783952417386
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2007
Event2007 9th European Control Conference, ECC 2007 - Kos, Greece
Duration: Jul 2 2007Jul 5 2007

Publication series

Name2007 European Control Conference, ECC 2007

Other

Other2007 9th European Control Conference, ECC 2007
CountryGreece
CityKos
Period07/2/0707/5/07

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering

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