Bonus payments as an anti-corruption instrument: A theoretical approach

Daniel Cracau, Benjamin Franz

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

We analyse bonus payments for officials, who transfer payments truthfully to the government rather than collecting bribes. We show that optimised bonus payments are always beneficial to the government, making them a more effective anti-corruption measure than simple wage increases. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.
Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-4
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume120
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 2013
Externally publishedYes

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