Secure protocols rely on a number of assumptions about the environment which, once made, free the designer from thinking about the complexity of what surrounds the execution context. Henceforth, the designer forgets about the environment and moves on proving her algorithm correct, given the assumptions. When assumptions do not represent with sufficient accuracy the environment they are supposed to depict, they may become the door to successful attacks on an otherwise mathematically correct algorithm. Moreover, this can happen as unwitting to systems as a Trojan Horse's action. We wish to discuss the theoretical underpinnings of those problems and evaluate some recent research results that demonstrate a few of those limitations in actual secure protocols. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007.
|Original language||English (US)|
|Title of host publication||Communications in Computer and Information Science|
|Number of pages||8|
|State||Published - Dec 1 2007|
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Computer Science(all)